The O.M. Scott case study published in 1989 in the Journal of Financial Economics has come to be a classic in illustrating the plausibility of some fundamental concepts that underpin mainstream models of the efficiency attributes of capital structure in modern corporate finance. In these models, high leverage traditionally appears as a strong incentive to refrain from sub-optimal investment behavior by self-interested managers. Thus reducing managerial agency cost has been considered as an essential driver of enhanced value in much of financial modeling. In the present paper, we attempt a somewhat different, albeit complementary, mainly resource based interpretation of the very rich empirical material contained in Baker and Wruck (1989) . In fact, a close reading of the case suggests that the observed significant increase in operating performance post-LBO was to a great extent the consequence of the yet unexplored cognitive changes implied by switching dominant shareholders. Namely, we find that value at O.M. Scott was essentially increased by (1) a significant reduction in what may be termed cognitive agency costs while (2) the new dominant shareholder contributed substantial cognitive value by stimulating and advising a dynamic learning process leading to enforced managerial capabilities, especially with respect to more effective routines of cash management.
In a well documented case study published in 1989 in the Journal of Financial Economics, Baker and Wruck described the case of the leveraged buyout of the O.M. Scott and Sons Company and the resulting substantial increase in operating performance. The analytic focus of their article may be described as an effort to apply the conceptual tool box of traditional positive agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986) to establish a plausible link between the incentive structure resulting from an increase in leverage and enhanced firm value. In an attempt to fully understand the nature and behavioral influence of incentives, Baker and Wruck achieved an in-depth analysis of the underlying (contractual) mechanisms.
In doing so, the authors not only confirmed some of PAT's (positive agency theory's) most fundamental reasoning, but also helped to put some flesh on the bones of the theoretical structure of one of the most prominent approaches modern corporate finance has to propose to come to grips with the classical capital structure puzzle raised by Modigliani and Miller (1958) .
While we basically agree with the major conclusions concerning the positive impact of the LBO's incentive structure on long-term value creation by imposing constraints on management limiting the possibilities of sub-optimal myopic behavior, we contend that there is more to it than merely financial discipline. Especially, a close reading of the O.M. Scott case raises the central question of where the superior value creation capability actually came from in the first place, rather than of how to simply reduce managerial agency costs of conflicting interests in the traditional sense (Berle and Means, 1932) . In fact, one of the shortcomings of traditional agency theory's financial modeling, when considered in its most rudimentary form, lies in its assuming opportunities for value creation to be given with objectively communicable performance parameters 1 (Jensen, 1986) 2 . In doing so, the financial models gain analytical sharpness. Narrowly focusing on problems of agency costs allows for parsimonious explanations of efficient capital structure changes in situations where improper alignment of incentives and failure in systems of control actually exist. However, reducing halshs-00746277, version 1 -28 Oct 2012 agency costs is but one possible, albeit potentially relevant, dimension along which to proceed in an effort to enhance value.
With a longstanding tradition in strategy research, the resource based approach of the firm as pioneered by Penrose (1959) takes on a different perspective. In doing so, it allows for a genuine understanding of some significant sources of value which are neglected by traditional PAT. Hence we hold that to fully understand the enhanced operating performance post-LBO it is useful to complement the rather narrow agency theory explanation contained in Baker and Wruck with resource based arguments, especially with respect to managerial cognition of productive opportunities (Barney, 1986) and the existence and development of firm-specific organizational capabilities (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997; Winter, 2000) .
In the present paper, we will argue that the O.M. Scott case as reported in Baker and Wruck (1989) actually contains some yet under-exploited empirical facts consistent with a resource based perspective on changes in capital structure. Notably, we establish that, beside the incentives of high leverage, the change of dominant shareholders brought about by the LBO (1) reduced value destroying cognitive cost by conferring more "coordination control 3 " over internally generated resources on incumbent management and (2) simultaneously stimulated a learning process allowing for the dynamic adaptation of organizational capabilities (e.g. more efficient management of working capital by changed routines of production) to perceived changes of the firm's environment 4 .
The paper is structured as follows. In the first section, we briefly recall the principal events of the O.M. Scott case as well as the main conclusions drawn by Baker and Wruck. In the second section, the major shortcomings of traditional capital structure analysis as well as one possible way of pushing our understanding further will be discussed. Sections three and four highlight and reinterpret some of the empirical evidence contained in the O.M. Scott case concerning respectively the impact of varying degrees of cognitive cost and of learning new organizational capabilities. Section five concludes insisting on the complementary halshs-00746277, version 1 -28 Oct 2012
contributions of PAT and resource based theory to the understanding of the performance impact of capital structure changes.
Principal Events around the O.M. Scott LBO
The following is a brief summary of the most salient events as reported in Baker and Wruck (1989) . At the time of the leveraged buyout, O.M. Scott was the largest producer of lawn care products in the United States. The company started off at the end of the nineteenth century as a specialist in the sale of farm crop seed, but reconverted itself at the beginning of the twentieth century when it commercialized weed-free lawn seed through the mail. In the nineteen-twenties, Scott came up with a series of product innovations, making it a first mover with respect to several new products which completed the range of the lawn market offer.
With respect to capital structure, it should be noted that Scott began as a family business and was closely held for almost a century. A major change in capital structure came about in 1971, when 100% of its stock was purchased by ITT, a widely diversified conglomerate.
During the period of the conglomerate's exclusive control, O.M. Scott management experienced significant restrictions with respect to capital resources. Internal funding was almost unavailable. In fact, the entire cash flow generated by the home lawn specialist was immediately transferred and brought under the conglomerate headquarters' control. The latter attributed financial resources only as a function of a bureaucratically controlled and relatively rigid budget. In fact, Baker and Wruck (1989) state that the ITT control system "did not give [Scott's] 6 . This a priori perception seems consistent with Baker and Wruck's (1989) observation of a significant actual increase in operating performance post LBO. The authors contend that, in this case, improved performance can be explained in a satisfactory manner by traditional PAT-reasoning. They "interpret their results as being consistent with an agency theory of the firm in which high leverage and managerial equity ownership lead to improved incentives and consequently improved operating performance." (p. 166, 167) Note that this traditional interpretation's emphasis lies on incentive alignment by granting an equity share to management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and on discipline by imposing constraints on managerial discretion through imposing a rigid debt repayment schedule (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990) . O.M. Scott's post-LBO capital structure is thus seen as enhancing value by reducing agency costs in essentially two ways. Management's equity share tends to align pursuit of personal interest by managers with shareholder interest. However, interest alignment of this sort remains imperfect and is thus further enhanced by the burden of high leverage which acts as a limit on free cash flow available for sub-optimal investment (Baker and Wruck, 1989, p. 172) . In a way consistent with a later study by Stulz (1990) , Baker and Wruck (1989) recognize however that not having enough cash flow can also be a problem in that it prevents management from undertaking all potentially available positive NPV projects. Consequently, the authors argue that this potential cause of underinvestment has been resolved in the Scott case by the very nature of the debt covenants which assure the availability of just enough internal funding while simultaneously cutting down excess cash flow. In the authors' own words "the company's high leverage combined with covenants and management equity ownership 
Major Shortcomings of Explanations Drawn from Traditional Capital

Structure Analysis
What is rather striking in Baker and Wruck's (1989) interpretation of their empirical material is the fact that the specific (cognitive) role of the new dominant shareholder, in this case the private equity firm, is not well explored. This may be explained in terms of traditional agency theory's almost exclusive analytical focus on the widely held managerial firm (Berle and Means, 1932) , where costs due to the pursuit of managerial self-interest are potentially pervasive 7 . In such a context, substantial gains may be expected by discipline and incentives leading to a decrease in agency costs in a traditional sense 8 . The relevance of mainstream explanations of capital structure thus really depends on the significance of managerial agency costs. However, the latter is most likely to be strongly reduced under a controlling dominant shareholder. In other words, ways of limiting managerial agency costs in the traditional sense may only significantly contribute to enhance value, where those problems are the main source of inefficiency in the first place. O.M. Scott never having been a managerial firm stricto sensu 9 , there may be some doubt concerning an explanation where the decrease in managerial agency costs, albeit present, is the only or even the most important driver of value.
In fact, a close reading of the O.M. Scott case suggests that we can gain further insight by analyzing this specific LBO-transaction not so much in terms of reducing agency costs, but rather in terms of "transaction value". According to the latter approach, "a wide variety of formal interorganizational arrangements is more a function of anticipated value gains, rather than anticipated losses due to the cost of constraining opportunism." (Zajac and Olsen, 1993, p. 132)
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A major difficulty of mainstream capital structure analysis in coming to grips with the creation of value is its supposing the range of possible value gains to be given, very much like a menu from which to choose. In fact, only to the extent that all possible positive NPV projects are known is the notion of free cash flow with the related managerial agency costs (Jensen, 1986) relevant. The problem of value then becomes one of discipline only. This mainly disciplinary perspective widely ignores the significant role of special productive skills as a distinct source of value. Even in those contributions to PAT where specific knowledge features explicitly (Jensen and Meckling, 1992) , the analytical focus is on monitoring as well as reward and punishment and, thus, on discipline rather than on the distinct role of competence.
Because in a real-world setting the development of cognition and related capabilities follows path-dependent learning processes (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000) , certain productive skills are highly idiosyncratic and cannot easily be communicated. Consequently, one important problem to solve in an effort to better understand the creation of value likely concerns cognitive asymmetry linked to the construction of yet unrecognized productive opportunities and the possession of special productive skills necessary to exploit these opportunities.
Cognitive asymmetry pertaining to methods of efficiently coordinating production activities is however distinct in nature from what promoters of agency theory commonly have in mind when they speak of asymmetric information 10 . Thus, traditional PAT seems insufficiently equipped to come to grips with enhanced performance in terms of the special productivity furnished by the specific knowledge and skill base of a closely cooperating (management)
team. In fact, while a case was made for special productivity of this sort in Alchian and Demsetz (1972) , one very important predecessor of agency theory, its sources were not explicitly discussed (Demsetz, 1988, p. 152 and constrained by an insulating layer of information that is specific to the firm, and this bundle cannot be altered or imitated easily or quickly." (Demsetz, 1988, p. 148) The cognitive dimension of enhanced performance and the conceptual proximity with Penrose through continuing association, and so is knowledge about the capabilities and limitations of the persons involved in this association." (Demsetz, 1988, p. 160) More recently, in an attempt to overcome the limits of mainstream theories of corporate finance 12 in explaining the efficiency attributes of different configurations of capital structure, Charreaux (2002) proposed to integrate agency theory and a more cognitive approach, essentially inspired by evolutionary economics (Alchian, 1950; Nelson and Winter, 1982) and research in strategic management of the resource based and organizational capabilities kind (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1986; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997 
In fact, by the time of the buyout, ITT contributed no specific cognitive value (V C ITT = 0), whereas cognitive cost under this owner appeared to be relatively high. 
, where the right-hand side takes on a negative value.
Hence, the value created by the LBO was essentially the sum of C&D's cognitive value to Scott and of a decrease in cognitive cost, which means that the most important drivers of value in this case were of a cognitive nature.
In the following two sections, we turn to a discussion of the empirical evidence in line with these assertions. This will also allow us to gain a deeper understanding of the underlying mechanisms.
Controlling Shareholder and Cognitive Cost
The O.M. Scott case actually illustrates the existence of relatively high cognitive cost under the former owner (ITT) and the way such cost may be relieved by a new dominant shareholder. In fact, with ITT closely controlling the allocation of internal funding, cognitive cost was opportunity cost due to foregone activities which were perceived by experienced incumbent management as potential sources of value.
According to Penrose (1959) , the management team is a potentially valuable resource and an essential driver of a firm's development. This is so because of the distinctive skills and understanding its members develop by constantly interacting inside of a particular organization 18 . Following such reasoning, managers' contribution to value is essentially cognitive, because the executive team exerts significant influence on the type of productive services in which the firm's specific bundle of resources is employed. In fact, beside the halshs-00746277, version 1 -28 Oct 2012
intrinsic value of certain resources, what really makes a difference for the creation of value is management's perception of yet unexploited productive opportunities (Barney, 1986) to which resources may "optimally" be channeled. Put differently, a key element in the creation of value is "coordination control" (Langlois and Robertson, 1995) , the way in which productive activities and the corresponding resources are consistently organized. Competence, however, to exert such control in a value enhancing fashion is no publicly available commodity but depends on cognitive structure and skills which evolve, at least partially, in a process of experiential and organization-specific learning. The latter is local and pathdependent, and the resulting knowledge is thus more or less difficult to transmit to outsiders to the extent that much learning of this kind is tacit in nature.
In the O.M. Scott case, the inability to communicate management's perception of specific productive opportunities to the ITT hierarchy which exerted tight coordination control over internal capital resources appears as a significant source of cognitive cost. As Baker and Wruck (1989) on managers' firm-specific knowledge, hence the incumbent management team was more valuable to the buyout firm. C&D was willing to pay managers more to reduce the risk of the managers quitting, and depriving Scott and C&D of this valuable knowledge." (Baker and Wruck, 1989, p. 177, emphasis added) However, to state that cognitive cost was less under C&D than under ITT does not mean that there was no cognitive divergence at all between the Scott management and the private equity firm. In fact, Scott managers had no influence on the choice of the LBO specialist, and the latter was unilaterally imposed by ITT. Hence, at the beginning of their relationship, Scott management clearly felt some cognitive divergence with the C&D staff. This is explicitly reported in the following quotation from Tadd Seitz.
"To be candid, they [C&D] weren't our first choice. It wasn't a question of their acumen, we just didn't think we had the chemistry. But as we went through the controlled bid process, it was C&D that saw the greatest value in Scott." (Baker and Wruck, 1989, p. 173) The use of the term "chemistry" most likely hints at the tacit dimension of mutual understanding. We think that this relative unease with the new dominant shareholder may reasonably be interpreted in terms of (at least slight differences) in mental structure. The ongoing relationship seems however to have deepened mutual understanding. In fact, quite to the contrary of their initial resentment, the Scott managers were actually encouraged to halshs-00746277, version 1 -28 Oct 2012
exploit their very own firm-specific competence. Hence, C&D's liaison partner with Scott, Henry Timnick, stated:
"Tadd kept asking me 'Can I do this? Can I do that?' I told him, 'You can do whatever you want so long as it is consistent with Scott's overall strategy.'" (Baker and Wruck, 1989, p. 183) Thus, though not completely eliminated, cognitive cost was significantly reduced under C&D as dominant shareholder. The reason for this is implicit in the following remark by Martin
Dubilier.
"ITT challenges managers not to rock the boat, to make budget. We challenge managers to improve the business. Every company takes on the personality of its CEO." (Baker and Wruck, 1989, p. 183) In this context, the composition of the board of directors can be seen as one possible way of managing cognitive divergence by gaining deeper mutual understanding in a process of ongoing interaction. This is so, because the board is a potentially important interface for active communication between managers and dominant shareholders. It is quite interesting to note that C&D's approach to board composition was explicitly not one of conflicting interests and discipline, but rather one of professional expertise.
"We will not put anyone on the board that the CEO doesn't want, but we [C&D] have to approve them. We do not see board members as extensions of ourselves, but they are not to be cronies or local friends of the CEO. We want people with expertise that the CEO doesn't have. The CEO should choose outside directors who are strong in areas in which he is weak." (Baker and Wruck, 1989, p. 181) Hence, it seems plausible to conclude that C&D's experience of the LBO business helped it develop specific routines (e.g. with respect to monitoring mechanisms) which help reduce cognitive cost through time by putting people on the board who are likely to understand each other, all the while contributing to the creation of cognitive value by ways of broadening management's perception of opportunities 19 . Consequently, even though there was perhaps initially some cognitive cost in the relationship with the new dominant shareholder, this cost rapidly declined and was significantly lower than the pre-LBO level.
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Developing Specific Capabilities of Cash Flow Management
Reduced cognitive cost, as illustrated above, is however only one of two cognitive dimensions useful in an explanation of enhanced performance. We now turn to the second dimension identified in the Charreaux (2002) model: cognitive value.
As suggested by Baker and Wruck (1989) , the strain put on cash flow by increased leverage acted as an incentive to create value. While we agree with this general conclusion, we contend that the very nature and working of those incentives -that is to say the fashion in which they precisely operate -are actually underexplored in traditional agency theory. The latter's explanation is essentially in terms of incentives for choosing exclusively positive NPV investments with fixed income streams from a pre-specified and well known set of opportunities. According to free cash flow theory, high leverage is a means of reducing incentives to over-invest. While this mechanism may be at work in some cases, we contend that it is not the most relevant for understanding O.M. Scott's substantially increased operating performance. Here, incentives for value creation actually took on a different form which has so far received less attention from the financial community. In fact, we find that in the Scott LBO, high leverage acted as a stimulus (or incentive) for learning, very much in line with Winter's (2000) characterization of the development of organizational capabilities as a satisficing search process. According to the latter analysis, overt learning to improve organizational capabilities takes place when there is a perceived gap between present capabilities and aspiration level. The intensive learning effort will most likely come to an end once the aspiration level is attained, which means that there is satisfaction with actual performance. Later on, satisficing search and related learning are possibly re-ignited when the aspiration level is shifted upwards.
In the case of O.M. Scott, it appears that high leverage, by putting strain on cash flow, lead to an upward shift in management's aspiration level with respect to capabilities related to the halshs-00746277, version 1 -28 Oct 2012 generation of internal funding. Thus stimulating a specific learning process should consequently be considered as a significant driver of Scott's enhanced operating performance.
In this context, leverage acted as an incentive, not so much by preventing waste of free cash flow, but rather by shifting upwards aspiration levels, thus stimulating search for more efficient routines of cash management.
In order to improve methods to gain better access to internal funding, Scott actually created a "working capital task force", headed by John Wall, assistant treasurer. This working group "was charged with reducing working capital requirements by 42%, or $25 million, in two years." (Baker and Wruck, 1989, p. 184) Note that this is a clear indication of a shift in aspiration levels. The result of such a shift is overt learning, as can be seen from the following account by Baker and Wruck (1989, p. 184) : "The task force helped Scott managers learn to manage cash balances, production, inventories, receivables, payables, and employment levels more effectively." (emphasis added) Consider also the following statement by John Wall, describing the way in which Scott tackled the challenge of controlling cash in order to meet debt service requirements.
"In the first six months after the LBO we had to bring in a state-of-the-art cash management system for a business of this size. We shopped a lot of treasury management systems and had almost given up on finding a system that would simply let us manage our cash. We didn't need a system that would keep track of our investment portfolios because we had $200 million borrowed. Finally, we found a product we could use. Under the LBO cash forecasting has become critical. I mean cash forecasting in the intermediate and long range. I don't mean forecasting what is going to hit the banks in the next two or three days. We could always do that, but now we track our cash flows on a weekly basis and we do modeling on balance sheets, which allows us to do cash forecasting a year out." (Baker and Wruck, 1989, p. 185, emphasis added) halshs-00746277, version 1 -28 Oct 2012 This account sheds some light on the temporal dimension of the search process and related learning. Intensive search stopped when the first satisfactory solution was found. This is clearly satisficing behavior 20 .
In this process, C&D gave some advice. More importantly, the private equity firm had a decisive influence on aspiration levels 21 and thus played a significant cognitive role. We interpret this as a manifestation of one particular mechanism by which a dominant shareholder may create cognitive value consistent with the model contained in Charreaux (2002) . The following figure summarizes the underlying mechanisms. 
Conclusion
A look on the curricula of the finance courses taught in several American business schools shows that the Baker and Wruck (1989) paper has become a widely utilized classroom classic to illustrate the workings of basic agency mechanisms 22 . While recent scandals such as Enron, Worldcom, and others illustrate the potential ongoing relevance of many arguments rooted in traditional agency theory, we contend that its applicability critically hinges on the presence of some typical characteristics of the managerial firm, especially with respect to capital structure. Where those characteristics are absent and shareholders are not widely dispersed, other factors than informational managerial agency costs are potentially more relevant in explaining performance changes. Indeed, in the present contribution we show that reduced agency costs in the traditional sense are far from being the most plausible explanation of O.M.
Scott's enhanced post-LBO operating performance. The case actually contains some very rich empirical material which is appealing to research integrating concepts from the fields of finance and strategy by considering not only financial discipline but also cognition and organizational capabilities. Following this line of reasoning, the evidence on O.M. Scott may plausibly be interpreted in terms of reduced cognitive cost and increased cognitive value brought about by changing the specific identity of the dominant shareholder. We actually find that, by granting greater coordination control over internal funding to incumbent management, Scott's new dominant shareholder (C&D) considerably reduced cognitive cost in the form of foregone investment opportunities specifically identified as such by management's idiosyncratic expertise. In addition, the new shareholder contributed special cognitive value by igniting and influencing a search and learning process for enhanced managerial capabilities.
Without rejecting the major findings of PAT, we think that future research in corporate finance and governance has much to gain from efforts aiming at establishing more integrated halshs-00746277, version 1 -28 Oct 2012
models which are open to the cognitive and resource based perspective. While mainstream approaches to capital structure issues are much concerned with the spoliation of owners and incentives to refrain from sub-optimal behavior within a range of given alternatives, the resource based view more closely focuses on the distinct contribution of a specific bundle of idiosyncratic resources to creating value as a response to endogenously constructed opportunities. Hence, the two approaches appear to be complementary, and the presence, in a real-world case, of elements from one or the other is most likely a matter of degree. The fundamental importance of aspects related to cognition and competence has not gone unrecognized by the most active promoters of agency theory themselves. In fact, the more recent developments in this field of research explicitly make room for issues of learning in an effort to create long-run value (Jensen, 2000; Wruck and Jensen, 1994) . Our own paper should thus be understood as one tentative contribution to flesh out this basic insight by delving into the underlying cognitive mechanisms.
